The Sunday Mail

This week’s focus will be on further anti-immigrant protests. There is a call for further action on Tuesday, and government’s concession has not satisfied protesters: marchers outside the Constitutional Court last Friday said the withdrawal of the Home Affairs directive did not nullify the ConCourt judgment. This poses an additional risk at a time when economic activity is weakening further, and the risk of persistent inflation is growing.

Last week’s data were weak, with the S&P Global PMI slipping back into contraction and manufacturing output contracting sharply in August. This reinforces our concerns about the recovery we expected in H2 this year and raises questions about the strength of the underlying growth recovery. The only major data point this week is mining output, and we expect another sizeable contraction that will make the sector a drag on Q3 growth. We continue to expect a long hold on the policy rate, but the risk of a January hike is growing given the increasing risks from El Niño and fuel price inflation, as highlighted in the SARB’s latest MPR.

In addition to the anti-immigrant protests planned for Tuesday, there have been calls for larger nationwide protests on election day, and tensions remain elevated ahead of the municipal elections. Political parties are at each other’s throats over whether to support March and March and its allies. There are growing accusations that parties are scoring political points rather than solving immigration issues.

The Cosatu 15th National Congress is scheduled to reconvene from Monday to Wednesday at Emperors Palace in Kempton Park. This is a major political watchpoint after September’s disrupted congress. Leadership decisions and resolutions could shape labour’s stance towards the ANC, SACP and government ahead of the municipal elections. The 8th Fedusa National Congress will take place from Wednesday to Friday in Johannesburg, where labour’s response to unemployment, rising living costs and economic reform will be debated. In the courts, the ConCourt will hear the ANC’s urgent appeal on Monday to reinstate 181 excluded candidates on the ballot for the November local government elections. As mentioned before, this matters for post-election coalitions, even in municipalities where the ANC does not expect to win an outright majority. On Monday and Tuesday, the Western Cape High Court is due to hear the EFF and ALPA’s challenge to the impeachment committee’s decision to withdraw its nomination of Advocate Thandazani Madonsela for the position of evidence leader.

In the energy sector, Eskom will, on Thursday, hold a clarification briefing on its latest request for qualifications for 6GW of renewable energy and battery projects. This is in addition to the recently announced 4.6GW battery storage determination by government. Africa Energy Week kicks off on Monday, focusing on the oil and gas industries. Minister of minerals and petroleum resources Gwede Mantashe, and the CEO of SANPC, Godfrey Moagi, are scheduled to address the conference – and will likely discuss the revival of refineries and the removal of barriers to exploration.

Transport Minister Barbara Creecy will undertake a site visit on Monday to inspect work being carried out during the Iron Ore Line’s annual maintenance shutdown, which is being implemented by the Transnet Rail Infrastructure Manager (TRIM). The shutdown, running from 6 to 16 October 2026, forms part of TRIM’s ongoing programme to improve the safety, reliability, capacity and efficiency of the rail network. The work builds on maintenance interventions undertaken on the corridor in May 2026. The Iron Ore Line is a critical component of South Africa’s freight logistics network, connecting mining production areas with export markets through the Port of Saldanha.

The 2026 Annual Meetings of the IMF and the World Bank Group will take place in Bangkok, Thailand, from Monday to Sunday. Key events include the plenary session and meetings of the Development Committee and the International Monetary and Financial Committee. Discussions of the energy shock, rising sovereign debt risks and elevated borrowing costs will be particularly important for emerging economies like SA. The key issues will be the implications for the currency, capital flows and bond yields, as well as monetary policy responses.

Parliament

On Tuesday, the portfolio committee on communications and digital technologies will host state entities, including BBI, Sentech, SITA, Nemisa and the USAASA/USAF, to brief the committee on their 2025/26 annual reports and financial statements.

By-elections

There are no more by-elections before the local government elections in November.

This week’s data includes only mining output for August, which we expect to contract sharply again as high precious-metal prices allow producers to remain profitable at lower output levels, given high fuel input costs. The sector is set to detract from Q3 GDP, barring any surprises.

Mining production for AugustTuesday

We expect mining production to contract by 6.2% yoy in August, following July's much weaker-than-expected 7.5% decline. This largely reflects very weak recent momentum, with one fewer working day than a year earlier as the Women’s Day public holiday was observed on Monday, compared with Saturday a year earlier (likely shaving off 0.4pp). PGMs, coal and iron ore remain the key downside risks after driving July's weakness, while ongoing operational disruptions and elevated input costs, particularly fuel, continue to weigh on production.

Precious metal prices also saw a strong rebound (especially gold and platinum), while coal prices edged higher. However, these higher prices do not necessarily translate to stronger volumes given elevated input costs – the opposite, actually; producers are able to protect profitability at lower output levels, given stronger prices. Mining should remain negative on a 3m3m seasonally adjusted basis at around -3.9%, making another negative contribution to Q3 GDP following the 3.0% qoq sa contraction in Q2 (we will publish our bean count model after this release to provide a better view of underlying activity and whether our 1.2% growth view is under pressure).

Last week’s data showed a sharp contraction in manufacturing output for August. The SARB’s gross reserves for September declined slightly due to gold price valuation effects, but remain very healthy, while the S&P PMI, also for September, swung to contractionary territory on particularly weak new sales orders.

There was a big downside surprise in August manufacturing, as it contracted by 4.3% yoy from +1.1% in July (we expected +0.8%, consensus +0.2%, though risk distribution was wide). The weakness was broad-based across nine of the ten major divisions: petroleum and chemicals (-5.0% yoy), vehicles (-8.8%) and food and beverages (-3.0%), although textiles continued to perform well (+5.7%). While elevated input costs and logistical constraints (including at Durban port, though we see the impact here as relatively limited) are certainly weighing on production, there also appear to be some unusual timing and seasonal effects in this print. Despite this, the 3m3m sa output improved to +1.1% from 0.9%, with eight of the ten divisions expanding – and while it is off a depressed base, the sector is still looking set to contribute to Q3 GDP growth after the -1.8% qoq sa contraction in Q2. The improvement in the September Absa PMI to expansionary territory reinforces this, even as the leg up in fuels remains a downside risk.

Gross reserves declined by USD0.5bn to USD75.4bn in September (we expected +USD0.2bn), while remaining at very healthy levels. Our miss was from gold reserves, which fell by USD1.1bn to USD16.9bn as the dollar gold price fell by 6.1% (we expected -USD0.4bn). FX reserves (including SDRs) increased by USD0.6bn to USD58.5bn as a USD1.5bn World Bank loan receipt on behalf of NT more than offset valuation effects and government FX payments.

Zooming out, reserves remain strong despite global risk-off – only down USD1.4bn compared to March levels and are USD4.2bn above September last year. This points to considerable resilience despite the external shock, preserving considerable capacity to absorb external shocks and providing a meaningful policy buffer, even if the SARB is unlikely to deploy it in any meaningful way.

The S&P PMI disappointed in September, falling to 49.0 from 50.5 in August, its weakest reading this year (we expected 50.7). We expected a slight improvement following the sharp rebound in the Absa manufacturing PMI into expansionary territory, but this clearly did not materialise – in line with our view that the Absa PMI overstates the improvement. While the surveys aren’t directly comparable, with S&P covering the broader private sector rather than manufacturing alone, the divergence is large. The biggest concern was new orders seeing their biggest drop in two and a half years, alongside contractions in output and inventories. Stronger business expectations and export orders provided some offset, but it does place downside risk on the September manufacturing view.

The MPR leaves our outlook unchanged: a prolonged hold followed by a July 2027 cut. January hike risks are rising, but markets’ pricing of November and January hikes appears excessive.

The MPR offered insightful analysis but little new insight into the SARB’s risk skew beyond what was already clear from the September MPC. The boxes were interesting and areas that we hoped for (see full summary below) – particularly the closer attention to refinery crack spreads, as well as El Niño and US monetary policy spillovers. Overall, the MPR has not shifted our MPC outlook. We keep our baseline view of a long hold, with the first cut only in July next year, but there is a risk of another 25bp hike in January if fuels go much higher and if the moderate El Niño baseline in both our forecast and the SARB’s gives way to something more worrying. The market is pricing in two more 25bp hikes for November and January, which we think is slightly excessive, for now at least. A November hike would require a more marked deterioration in the fuel outlook and may come too early for enough evidence on food, but it needs to be watched.

Summary of boxes

• * Box 1: Beyond the spreadsheets – economic intelligence: Introduces the SARB’s business liaison programme. Firms report weak demand and very price-sensitive consumers, with competition limiting fuel-cost pass-through and forcing firms to absorb more through margins. Supportive of relatively contained near-term second-round effects.
• * Box 2: Cheaper electricity would boost growth: Quantifies the growth cost of high electricity tariffs. Limiting tariff increases to 3% could add ~1.3pp cumulatively to GDP by 2029, while also lowering inflation and the required policy rate.
• * Box 3: Widening refinery margins pose a risk to domestic inflation: The SARB starts to consider crack spreads more closely (as it did in the September MPC forecast update). The point is that refinery/crack margins – especially diesel – have effectively decoupled from crude because global refining capacity is constrained. Fuel prices could therefore remain elevated even if Brent falls, with diesel creating sizeable indirect food/core inflation risks.
• * Box 4: US monetary policy spillovers and emerging market vulnerabilities: A 100bp Fed hike is associated with around 43bp of EM tightening and ~52bp in SA. The SARB stresses this is mainly through the rand/inflation channel rather than mechanically following the Fed.
• * Box 5: From artificial intelligence euphoria to scrutiny: New risks: Increasing leverage behind the AI investment boom raises the risk of a broader market correction. Direct SA exposure is limited, with the main risk through global risk-off, capital outflows and rand weakness.
• * Box 6: South Africa’s investment puzzle: SA appears stuck in a low-investment regime – investment is ~14% of GDP, and the estimated probability of remaining in the regime is ~99%. Reform progress has not yet been enough to meaningfully shift investment (our view is that probability is a bit too high, and we see reform momentum arriving over the next two years).
• * Box 7: Bracing for impact: El Niño and food prices: Despite a >75% probability of severe El Niño, the SARB assumes only a limited food-price response given favourable starting conditions – this is in line with our view. Only very strong events have historically had a significant effect – potentially lifting food inflation ~2.5pp and headline ~0.5pp.

News of Zuma’s hospitalisation surfaced last week and coincides with concerns about the health of several other leaders. While Zuma’s poor health poses limited immediate electoral risk to MKP, his absence could matter more in 2029.

Illness is a recurring concern with a leadership cohort of this age: Jacob Zuma, Paul Mashatile, Cyril Ramaphosa, Gwede Mantashe and Enoch Godongwana.

Zuma’s health is not great, but he has a robust constitution. We think concerns about the impact of his death on the MKP are overstated, particularly in the short term. If he died before 4 November, we would expect no material impact on the election results. He is currently a largely passive campaigner, while the party’s former ANC branches have experienced campaigners who can operate with relatively little central funding or support.

The 2029 national campaign would be a different matter. Without Zuma, we would expect some loss of support, and dysfunction at the centre would become more consequential. Duduzane Zuma’s ability to energise the party and hold it together would then be tested. He might succeed to some degree, though not entirely. Even then, we suspect the impact of Jacob Zuma’s absence would be overstated.

Mashatile is back at work. We understand that he had a serious illness, underwent a major operation and needed a lengthy recovery. However, we think he also took additional time to keep a low profile during the local election campaign and avoid the party turmoil surrounding Mbalula. There is little incentive to intervene when a leadership rival is damaging his own prospects. We expect Mashatile to remain largely out of the spotlight until he launches his leadership campaign in the new year. His health could still take him out of contention next year, but we regard this as a tail risk.

Ramaphosa was ill after the BRICS summit but has fully recovered. We do not currently see his health as a material risk before the end of his ANC leadership term in early February 2028.

Mantashe has reportedly been unwell for some time and has discussed his departure with Ramaphosa in recent months. He wants to step down as mineral and petroleum resources minister around next year’s SONA, but Ramaphosa would prefer him to remain until early 2028. No firm decision has been made. There is no obvious successor, and we do not see the deputy minister as a likely candidate. Mantashe would, however, retain his position as ANC chairperson rather than step down early.

We understand that Godongwana’s health remains manageable, although less than ideal. His agreement with Ramaphosa is to stay until February 2028. An earlier departure remains a tail risk, particularly given the lack of a clear succession plan. If Mashatile takes over, we understand that he would favour Parks Tau as finance minister, a choice we would view with concern.

Anti-immigrant violence escalated last week, following a directive reopening asylum applications, with government distrust and election campaigning fueling unrest. Withdrawing the directive may offer limited relief, while rising fuel costs and an election-day shutdown threat could heighten tensions before 4 November.

Since Wednesday, anti-immigrant violence and protests have escalated in several parts of the country, particularly in Durban and parts of Johannesburg, including outside the Constitutional Court.

Why has unrest resurfaced after the repatriation of undocumented foreigners and other measures taken mid-year? The immediate trigger appears to have been a Department of Home Affairs (DHA) directive dated 28 September, which circulated on social media and brought renewed attention to the Constitutional Court’s July judgment. In accordance with the judgment, the directive reopened an asylum system that had effectively been closed since 2020. More than 2,000 people gathered at DHA offices in Durban to lodge applications, but vigilantes attempted to turn them away. March and March were particularly active.

The IFP’s deputy mayoral candidate in eThekwini then helped mobilise opposition, while broader political messaging contributed to protests spreading to Johannesburg. Although protest numbers have been moderate, we have seen considerably more vehicle burnings this time. The election is clearly acting as a catalyst. Government, meanwhile, has been caught on the back foot, discussing constitutional amendments that cannot realistically be implemented within any meaningful time frame.

Government has responded by deploying the SANDF in Soweto and withdrawing the directive while exploring alternative ways to comply with the court order. In theory, this could ease tensions. However, protesters quickly pointed out that withdrawing the directive does not suspend the judgment and have vowed to continue. Those protesting outside the Constitutional Court want it to suspend enforcement of the ruling.

We see the underlying cause as persistent distrust of government and institutions over immigration, an issue left unresolved by the mid-year interventions. In particular, protesters distrust assurances that the judgment will not facilitate illegal immigration.

The mid-year unrest subsided after a sufficiently large number of people were repatriated. Repeating that response will be harder now. We expect protests could continue for several more days and flare up again before the 4 November election. There are already threats of a national shutdown on election day.

At the same time, March and March continues to gain mainstream political acceptance, with further meetings involving the Gauteng DA, which Geordin Hill-Lewis has been unable to stop, and an alliance with some Afrikaner groupings.

Fuel costs could add to these pressures. Following the latest petrol-price increases, we anticipate another increase of around 130c/l in November. With no fuel relief yet, this could become another catalyst for unrest.

It emerged last week that ANC secretary-general Fikile Mbalula and former Cabinet minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma will be required to testify in their defamation dispute over claims of vote buying during the party’s 2022 leadership contest.

The High Court in Johannesburg has ordered oral evidence to be heard in the defamation case between Fikile Mbalula and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. The case stems from Dlamini-Zuma’s allegations that Mbalula bought votes at the ANC’s 2022 national conference. It could offer a rare examination of vote buying, a practice widely associated with ANC leadership contests but seldom supported by clear evidence.

In responding to curtailment challenges, the Department of Electricity and Energy (DEE) has issued a s34 determination for 4.6GW for battery energy storage, a welcome move. However, we remain sceptical of the 5GW for gas-to-power determination, which we see lagging behind.

The DEE is rolling out its mega-bid window in phases, having first announced s34 determinations for 4.6GW BESS and 5GW gas-to-power largely to support grid stability and address curtailment. Variable generation like wind and solar will likely be provided for in the next determination. This marks a shift from following the Integrated Resource Plan to the T, and instead procuring based on system needs, which is a breakthrough for procurement planning, especially as the Central Purchasing Agency is to take over this role.

Given the slow pace of getting Bid Window 1 of the Gas Independent Power Producer Programme moving (we only see power online from 2033), getting a further 5GW off the ground is certainly a few years away and hardly a short-term solution for curtailment.

Alongside these efforts, Eskom has issued a request for qualification for 6GW of renewable energy and battery projects by 2030 – with the resulting agreements to be transferred to Eskom Green. Hybrid projects (battery and wind/solar) are expected to pick up to meet system requirements and also to limit curtailment.

Curtailment dominated discussions at Windaba, with both the minister and the NTCSA putting forward several solutions; however, these are no quick fixes and project bankability remains an issue in the near term.

The NTCSA may have cleared the payment backlog on curtailment – following a six-fold surge since last year – but the focus now is on long-term, financially sustainable solutions as curtailment is set to rise. Minister Ramokgopa touted increasing daytime consumption, possible cross-border trade and relying on data centres and smelters as off-takers. But those are big picture plans and not formal strategies with clear deliverable pathways and timelines.

The NTCSA proposes similar solutions, including the expansion of storage (which we see playing out with the release of the new s34 determination), along with introducing new technology requirements that meet system needs and, critically, grid expansion. In the meantime, while curtailment for s34 IPPs has clear compensation routes, it is the private sector that is left in the dark without certainty on the curtailment projections, adding another layer of risk that will be hard to finance.

As for addressing grid constraints, the delays to the independent transmission project procurement programme were also discussed at the conference, with potential preferred bidders and lenders stressing bankability issues that must be resolved. Among them were the sharing of risks between developers and the NTCSA, and indexing tariffs to cost trends and not consumer price inflation only, as the latter does not adequately capture price escalation of equipment. The Credit Guarantee Vehicle also needs to be in place to resolve payment risks banks are concerned about. Much is riding on the second consultation process with prequalified bidders so that the second draft request for proposal can address these issues.

Eskom is expected to provide an update on its revised coal decommissioning schedule by the end of the year; it is seeking shareholder approval to extend the life of some plants beyond 2030, as highlighted previously.

Eskom officials at various engagements last week emphasised intentions to pursue clean coal technologies, and seek a delayed decommissioning schedule. They told parliament that while the Integrated Resource Plan 2025 envisions 8GW of coal retirements by 2030, this is conditional on new dispatchable capacity such as gas and batteries coming on stream. Our estimates are that gas will be delayed beyond 2030, and the speed with which batteries can be deployed also depends on how fast they will reach financial close. Eskom has admitted that some stations will probably run beyond 2030, subject to shareholder approval, which is very likely given the political sensitivity around shutting down plants. Minister Ramokgopa similarly, at a dialogue on the oil and gas industry last Friday, endorsed the pursuit of an energy mix that includes coal. However, the continued push to adopt clean coal technologies remains puzzling.

What’s not resolved are the implications for emissions, and carbon tax and other penalties like the carbon border adjustment mechanism that are conveniently left out of the conversation now – even though the pain won’t be avoidable later.

The NWRIA is due to become fully operational by 1 April 2027, but will inherit about ZAR71bn in delayed TCTA projects, while weak debt collection leaves the Water Trading Entity (WTE) with limited cash cover. The WTE’s liquidity and collection risks will move to the NWRIA.

The Auditor-General of South Africa (AGSA) presented its annual report to the Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS). Based on its findings, it has flagged ongoing matters linked to the TCTA and the WTE, which will be transferred to the South African National Water Resources Infrastructure Agency (NWRIA). The NWRIA will inherit delayed projects. Three TCTA projects worth ZAR71bn are behind schedule. Phase 2A of the Mokolo-Crocodile scheme (ZAR19.7bn) was meant to supply Eskom’s Medupi and Matimba power stations and the Waterberg from April 2025. It is now 50 months behind, with water due in January 2030. The uMkhomazi project (ZAR49.5bn) is meant to serve more than six million people in KwaZulu-Natal. It is now due in March 2032, more than seven years later than expected. The Berg River-Voëlvlei scheme (ZAR1.7bn) is over a year behind.

Both entities (TCTA and WTE) will struggle to fulfil their mandates unless debt collections improve. The WTE takes about 475 days to collect outstanding payments and holds cash covering only 1.5 months of operating costs. Those risks will pass to the NWRIA when the WTE moves across. What to watch is whether the department meets the preconditions for legally transferring the WTE and the TCTA before the 1 April 2027 deadline, and whether collections improve before then.

Dirco told the portfolio committee on international relations and cooperation that it faces mounting maintenance costs and staffing shortages across its foreign missions, prompting calls for closures despite strategic risks. MPs also demanded urgent action on foreign government debts, including Zimbabwe’s longstanding ZAR1bn-plus debt to SAA.

At last Tuesday’s briefing to the portfolio committee on international relations and cooperation, Dirco said it needed more than ZAR300m annually to maintain its foreign mission buildings. Some 30% are in poor condition, while only 28% are in good condition. Ageing infrastructure and heritage requirements, particularly in Europe, have made maintenance expensive. The department has been selling underutilised properties to reduce these costs.

Dirco also acknowledged that it lacks the staff and technical capacity to manage its extensive property portfolio, with only seven employees responsible for this work. Several missions also have unfilled posts. South Africa maintains 114 diplomatic missions across 102 countries.

Some MPs suggested closing selected missions to cut costs and realign South Africa’s diplomatic presence. The US, for example, intends to close five missions in Canada, Grenada, Japan, Indonesia and Cameroon on cost grounds, although critics warn that this could weaken its influence. Similar decisions by South Africa could signal a shift in foreign policy.

Dirco cautioned that closing missions carries significant strategic risks. It cited Cabinet’s 2021 decisions to close the embassies in Finland and Oman, which subsequently had to be reconsidered because of the political and economic consequences. South Africa currently relies on honorary consulates and non-resident diplomatic representation in those countries.

In a separate discussion, the committee pressed Dirco to account for outstanding debts owed to South Africa by foreign governments, some of which have accumulated over many years. These include more than ZAR1bn owed by Zimbabwe to SAA, which is constraining the airline’s ability to expand and modernise its fleet.

The committee urged Dirco to develop mechanisms to address cases where foreign governments fail or refuse to settle their debts to South Africa. It said it would engage the department further on the issue.

Last week, MPs called for auction industry reforms and an accredited black auctioneer panel to advance transformation and protect South Africa’s assets.

Last Tuesday, the Portfolio Committee on Trade, Industry and Competition met with auction industry representatives and regulatory bodies to discuss the sale and disposal of South Africa’s strategic and productive assets and the implications for economic transformation. Participants included the B-BBEE Commission, the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, the South African Institute of Auctioneers and the South African Professional Auctioneers Association.

The meeting followed the committee’s call last month for public comments on the regulation and functioning of the auction industry. Concerns included the growth of online auctions, which could give foreign-based buyers an unfair advantage when acquiring strategic and productive assets, and the industry’s limited progress on transformation.

The committee called for urgent policy and regulatory reform. It also urged government stakeholders to establish an accredited panel of black auctioneers to expand business opportunities and market access for emerging auction enterprises owned by historically disadvantaged people.

Last week, Parliament’s ad hoc committee investigating allegations made by Lieutenant General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi reported no evidence in its draft report linking suspended police minister Senzo Mchunu to alleged criminal kingpin Vusimuzi “Cat” Matlala, although concerns remain over accountability and disbanding the Political Killings Task Team.

In a surprising development, the draft report of Parliament’s ad hoc committee found no evidence linking suspended police minister Senzo Mchunu to alleged criminal kingpin Vusimuzi “Cat” Matlala, who is being held in a high-security prison. The finding appears in the committee’s 791-page draft report, completed last Wednesday.

However, concerns remain about Mchunu’s executive accountability and integrity, particularly his role in disbanding the Political Killings Task Team. The committee has until 30 October to submit its final report to Parliament.

The matter is far from settled. The Madlanga Commission has separately heard testimony and received evidence implicating Mchunu in several controversial matters.

Last Wednesday, the Pretoria High Court set aside the B-BBEE Legal Sector Code over Minister Tau’s failure to exercise independent discretion, referring it back for reconsideration without ruling on its constitutionality.

Last Wednesday, the Pretoria High Court set aside the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition’s B-BBEE Legal Sector Code, ruling that Minister Parks Tau had failed to exercise independent statutory discretion before gazetting it in 2024. After taking office in July that year, Tau did not address concerns previously raised by his predecessor, Ebrahim Patel, about the proposed code.

The court referred the matter back to the minister for reconsideration but did not rule on whether the code complies with the Constitution or B-BBEE legislation. The code required large law firms to achieve 50% black ownership within five years, including at least 25% ownership by black women.

The judgment is a victory for the firms that challenged the code, including Bowmans and Werksmans, and a setback for government’s efforts to accelerate transformation in the legal sector. It remains unclear whether the department will appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal.

Government plans a Ramaphosa-led commission to oversee SOEs following the holding-company bill’s withdrawal, it emerged last week. Meanwhile, interim appointment and remuneration guidelines are being developed to address a largely unimplemented Zondo Commission recommendation.

Following the withdrawal of the controversial SOE Bill, which proposed establishing a holding company, government has announced plans for a new commission chaired by President Cyril Ramaphosa to oversee state-owned enterprises.

Details of its mandate remain limited, but the commission is expected to draw on elements of the Chinese and Norwegian models, including China’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission.

Meanwhile, the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation is developing interim guidelines for SOE appointments and remuneration as part of broader reforms. These would address a key recommendation of the Zondo Commission that remains largely unimplemented.